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“We Have to Take it to the Top!”1: Workers,
State Policy, and the Making of Home Care*
JENNIFER KLEIN†
EILEEN BORIS††
On Halloween 1988, seventy-five Chicago home care
workers shouted in front of the Evanston residence of Janet
Otwell, director of the Illinois Department of Aging (IDOA):
“No More Tricks, Treat Us with Dignity and Respect!”2 For
weeks, Otwell had rebuffed their requests for a meeting, so
these black women, members of Service Employees
International Union (SEIU) Local 880, finally took dramatic
action.3 Seeking to draw attention to “poverty wages and the
union-busting activity of vendors in the state’s home health
care program,” they marched on her lawn, posted notices on
her door and those of her neighbors, and caused a
commotion reminiscent of the heyday of the welfare rights
movement.4 Local 880 President Irma Sherman declared:
“The vendors are making a tidy profit and we are left living
from paycheck to paycheck, with no health coverage and no
benefits to speak of—we’re tired of their bag of tricks.”5
Since IDOA set the framework for elder home care, the
union demanded a voice in policymaking along with
 Unless otherwise indicated, portions of the following discussion have been
drawn from and expand upon scholarship reported in EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER
KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE
WELFARE STATE (2012).
1. Union Members Going to Springfield, THE HOMEMAKERS’ VOICE, Mar.
1985 (quoting Local 880 union member Mary Jones).
†Yale University.
††U.C. Santa Barbara.
2. For Immediate Release: Homecare Workers Give Halloween Message to
Director of Aging, Oct. 29, 1988, in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 3, Folder 2,
available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Letter from Gale S. Thetford to Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local
880 (Oct. 31, 1988), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 3, Folder 2, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society.
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advocates for the aged. Local 880 got the attention of the
state and soon became a player in home care politics.6
Community organizing and political unionism, Local
880 found, could together improve the lives of home health
care workers.7 On the one hand, the SEIU had discovered
an alternative route to unionization through grassroots
action.8 Rather than an offshoot of a pre-existing local, Local
880 began as part of the United Labor Unions (ULU), a
project of the Association for Community Organizations for
Reform Now or ACORN. ULU represented a workforce
counterpart to the neighborhood organizing of ACORN.9 On
the other hand, given the structure of home care, it was
never enough just to win collective bargaining rights with
individual agencies—as unions in New York already had
learned. To make economic gains, the union had to go to
government.10 But with Reagan Era assaults on public
benefits and government employees, turning to the state for
economic rights was no easy matter.11 Political unionism
would require innovative tactics and new allies.12
Home aides and attendants perform intimate tasks of
daily life—such as bathing, brushing teeth, dressing,
cooking, and cleaning—that enable aged, disabled, or
chronically ill people to live decent lives at home.13 These
essential workers are America’s front-line caregivers, but
they earn average hourly wages lower than that of all other
jobs in health care and historically have labored without
security of employment, social benefits, or even workers’
6. EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 149 (2012).
7. Id. at 149.
8. See id. at 149-81 (demonstrating the use of grass roots action and
organizing by Local 880).
9. Id. at 138-43, 176-81; VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS’ UNIONS: REBUILDING
LABOR FROM BELOW 101-28 (2005).
10. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 149.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Duties,
Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5,
2012), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-care-aides.
htm#tab-2.
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compensation.14 They labor in private spaces meeting
individual and family needs.15 But how they do so is a story
of political economy, one that reflects the major shifts in the
welfare state and economic life that define contemporary
America. Home care aides make up a vast workforce of over
1.8 million workers16—much larger than those of the iconic
industries of auto and steel—that links our most
challenging social issues: an aging society; the enormous
medical sector and its ability to prolong life; the neo-liberal
restructuring of public services; immigration; disability
rights; the prospects of health care for all and the potential
of a new American labor movement.
Home care is currently the fastest growing occupation
in the nation, adding hundreds of thousands of positions at
a steady clip Numbering almost two million at the start of
the Great Recession, the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics projects the fastest employment growth in home
health aide jobs through 2020.17
These low-waged workers stand at the center of a new
care work economy, defined by a continuum of jobs: hospital
workers, nursing home aides, child care workers, teachers’
aides, preschool teachers, school lunch room aides, mental
health and substance abuse social workers and counselors,
social and human services assistants and specialists, and
occupational therapists.18 These jobs are also increasingly
14. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Pay,
Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5,
2012),
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-careaides.htm#tab-5.
15. See Home Health Aides and Personal and Home Care Aides: Duties, supra
note 13.
16. See Home Health and Personal Care Aides, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-careaides.htm#tab-1.
17. See id.; Home Health and Personal Care Aides: Job Outlook, Occupational
Outlook Handbook, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/Healthcare/Home-health-and-personal-careaides.htm#tab-6.
18. Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Organizing the Carework Economy: When
the Private Becomes Public, in RETHINKING U.S. LABOR HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE
WORKING-CLASS EXPERIENCE, 1756–2009, at 192-216 (Donna Haverty-Stacke &
Daniel J. Walkowitz eds., 2010) [hereinafter Boris & Klein, Organizing the
Carework Economy].
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important because they cannot be offshored. Wherever
capital may migrate globally to produce goods or provide
technical services, care work stays home. As had been the
case with manufacturing a century earlier, waves of new
immigrants continually replenish these jobs. Consequently,
women’s labors—once considered outside of the market or at
the periphery of economic life—have now become the
strategic sites for worker struggle and the direction and
character of the American labor movement.
Just about the only growth in the United States labor
movement has been in health care, public employment, food
service and hotels, education, and domestic labors.19 These
workers transformed organizing strategy, union demands,
and the very nature of collective bargaining. Home care
became a pivotal sector in which unions experimented with
new tactics. Since the job stood outside New Deal labor
laws, unionization had to take shape apart from that
framework. Workers also had to take account of the complex
interpersonal relations essential to carework. They had to
enter into alliances with the receivers of care (who have
labeled themselves “consumers”). Even though they labored
in private homes and had no standing as employees, they
turned the public welfare state itself into a terrain of social
struggle. By 2010, over 400,000 home care workers had
joined unions, although over the last year their union and
bargaining rights have been jeopardized by the conservative
governors that took over state houses in 2010 Republican
sweep.20
We have sought to rethink the history of the American
welfare state from the perspective of care work. Social
policies are not just income transfer programs. They also
depend on a particular configuration of labor that facilitates
support on a daily basis. Government has had a central role
in creating labor markets in human and social services.
Broad trends in United States social policy over the latter
19. See Dorothy Sue Cobble & Michael Merrill, The Promise of Service
Unionism, in SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Cameron McDonald &
Marek Korczynski eds., 2009); John Schmitt & Kris Warner, The Changing Face
of Labor, 1983–2008, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES. 1, 18 (2009); Economic News
Release,
U.S.
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
(Apr.
5,
2012),
http://bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
20. Interview with Keith Kelleher, President, SEIU Healthcare Illinois and
Indiana (Oct. 2011).
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half of twentieth century fostered the creation of new
occupations, funded by the state, and actively channeled
particular workers into these jobs, especially poor and
minority women, deploying and perpetuating gender and
racial inequality. The beneficiaries of the services, the
structure of the industry, and the terms and conditions of
the labor were all products of state intervention.
Home care has existed in a clouded nether world
between public and private, family care and employment. It
was possible because of the devaluation of women’s work
and the stigmatization attached to the labor of poor women
of color. The labor, however, is devalued not just because of
its ascribed racial or gendered meanings but because of the
way the state chooses to structure it. This outcome, we
show, is historical rather than epiphenomenal; devaluation
is not only structural and ideological but a product of
conflict and accommodation between experts, state
authorities, workers, care receivers, and institutions since
the New Deal.
For decades, while the American population, like that of
Western Europe, has aged and baby boomers have moved
toward retirement, the United States Congress failed to
enact a genuine long-term care policy. In the absence of
guaranteed social insurance, the default has been to use
public assistance and Medicaid. In our research, we
primarily discuss services funded through various public
programs. They are not unconnected, however, to the
allegedly “private market” wherein middle-class families
purchase care for their loved ones. The United States
reliance primarily on means-tested social services available
only to the poorest people fundamentally shaped the entire
labor market for care. The claim of the Supreme Court in
2007 in Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,21 in
sustaining the exclusion of home care workers from the
nation’s wage and hour law, exemplifies the fear that only
through cheap labor can we provide long term care. The
assumption that the provision of care is a zero-sum trade-off
further implies that denial and self-sacrifice are essential to
a genuine “ethic of care.” Caring for America argues that we
all have a stake in rethinking that assumption.

21. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
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I. ORIGINS
Home care as a distinct occupation emerged in the crisis
of the Great Depression to meet both welfare and health
imperatives.22 One strand took shape as work relief for
unemployed black women who previously labored in
domestic service.23 During the New Deal, state funding
began to play a significant role in formulating a new
occupation that helped poor families and individuals with
medical emergencies, chronic illness, and old age, while
curtailing the costs of institutionalization.24 Through
Homemaker Service, state and local governments would
provide support to one group of needy Americans, women
with children, through employing another needy group,
poor, unemployed women, as “substitute mothers.”25 The
government employed homemakers directly through the
Works Progress Administration (WPA).26
Relieving public hospitals of long-term elderly and
chronically ill patients became the other origin of statesupported home-based care.27 The WPA initiated programs
to move such people out of the hospital and give them the
necessary assistance to become “independent” at home. 28
These programs often called the workers “housekeepers,”
reflecting the non-medical designation of service workers in
22. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id.; MAUD MORLOCK, HOMEMAKER SERVICES: HISTORY AND
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-3 (1964); Report on the First Year’s Work of the WPA Project,
February 15, 1937, in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Collection, Smith
College, Box 4, Folder 50.
27. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11.
28. Id. at 11, 28-30 (citing FINAL REPORT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS
ADMINISTRATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 212 (1945); Marta Fraenkel,
Housekeeping Service for Chronic Patients, WELFARE COUNCIL OF NEW YORK CITY
(1942); S.S. Goldwater, The Aims of the Department of Hospitals, in THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH IN PREVENTION AND CARE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS:
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING HELD BY THE COMMITTEE ON CHRONIC
ILLNESS, in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Archives, Smith College, Box
3, Folder 48; The Hospitalization of the Chronically Ill (NBC broadcast Apr. 18,
1935), in Mary C. Jarrett Papers, Sophia Smith Archives, Smith College, Box 3,
Folder 48).
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hospital settings.29 In either case, central to this origin was
the location of the program in assistance to the poor.30 Not
only the workers but also the clients, who obtained
eligibility for the service from the Department of Welfare,
had to be destitute.31
Yet while these 1930s public works programs created
paid caregiving positions, New Deal labor law ignored the
resulting workforce. The labor rights of the New Deal—old
age
insurance,
unemployment
benefits,
collective
bargaining, minimum wages, and maximum hours—
excluded nurse companions, homemakers, and other inhome care workers from coverage. In 1940, the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) categorized nurse-companions and
other in-home care workers hired directly by clients as
domestic workers.32 As the New Deal made work the entrée
to a host of new social benefits, domestic work suffered
further marginalization.
The New Deal left a three-fold legacy, which persisted
through the rest of the century.33 Although tied to the
medical sector, the state would pay for home-based care
through welfare agencies but often with federal funds.
Second, policy experts and welfare administrators saw
female public assistance recipients as a ready supply of
labor for home care.34 And, third, the exclusion of home
attendants from national wages and hours laws would
remain in place for the next seven decades.35 Though first
focused on families with children, with the growth of Social
Security after World War II, homemaker services came to
29. Id. at 11; The Story of the Housekeeping Aides Project, March 7, 1938, in
HEALTH, PRODUCTION, AND SERVICE PROJECTS OF THE PROFESSIONAL AND SERVICE
DIVISION OF THE WPA, NEW YORK CITY (1939), available at Part I, PSP, folder,
“Narrative Reports NYC,” RG 69, Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., College
Park, Md.
30. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 11.
31. Fraenkel, supra note 28, at 81-82.
32. See PHYLLIS PALMER, DOMESTICITY AND DIRT: HOUSEWIVES AND DOMESTIC
SERVANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1920–1945, at 111-35 (1989); MARY POOLE,
SEGREGATED ORIGINS OF SOCIAL SECURITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE WELFARE
STATE (2006).
33. Id. at 39.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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prioritize the support for the elderly, a group of voters
privileged by the American welfare state over other
recipients of social assistance.36
Following World War II, private family agencies led by
women social workers and aided by the U.S. Children’s
Bureau attempted to create a good job for “mature women”
and define a new occupation—a job that took place in the
home but performed the public work of the welfare state.37
Over the next decade, a mixture of public welfare
departments and private agencies established visiting
homemaker programs and boarding programs to maintain
aged and disabled people in the community rather than in
more expensive hospitals and nursing facilities.38 The
service grew through demonstration projects and charities
receiving child welfare grants and assistance to the indigent
aged.39 They aimed at convincing the community to fund
centralized public services.40
The promotion of home care in the two decades after
WWII demonstrates how competing definitions of care—
particularly the labor of care—fundamentally shaped old
age, disability, and welfare policy; job training; and an
emerging labor market.41 Welfare, health, and medical
professionals held contrasting views on the location of care;
they also had distinct ideas about who should perform the
valorized or menial aspects of such labor.42 Gendered and
racialized understandings of carework, home life, and
institutional authority initially led home care down two
36. Id.
37. See id. at 44 nn.18, 20 (citing U.S. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, SUPERVISED
HOMEMAKER SERVICE: A METHOD OF CHILD CARE, PUB. 296 (1943); NAT’L COMM.
FOR HOMEMAKER SERV., Minutes of Meeting, Nov. 13-14, 1947, New York 4,
available at Central Files 1949–1952, Box 119, Folder “4-6-11,” RG-102, U.S.
Children’s Bureau Records, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., College Park,
Md.; Homemaker (dom. Ser.) housekeeper, visiting, 677, Domestic Service
Occupations (2.00.00-2.09.99), in DIV. OF OCCUPATIONAL ANALYSIS, USES, FSA,
SSA, BUREAU OF EMP’T SECURITY, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES, VOL. II
(1949), at 59).
38. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 40.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 41-42.
42. Id. at 42.
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developmental tracks: a social work model and a medical
care model.43 Throughout this process, social workers sought
to maintain some control over a new occupation in the face
of its increased medicalization.44
The rapidly expanding postwar medical system sought
its own strategies for aiding the chronically ill and disabled
persons. Home care offered a possible remedy for problems
of overcrowding and patient priority driven by budget
concerns.45 Voluntary hospitals could move chronically ill,
often impoverished patients out—without abandoning
them.46 In this medical model, home care would become one
element in a far-reaching medical institutional complex
extending outward from the hospital.47
Welfare and medical initiatives shared an emphasis on
dependency, defined in social, psychological, physical, and
gendered terms.48 Professionals in each realm agreed that
large numbers of relief recipients suffered from chronic
illness or impairments.49 With the right intervention—or
care—a significant percentage of such individuals should
and could be moved off public assistance, the categorical
programs for the elderly, disabled, and children.50 Each
group deployed notions of rehabilitation toward the goal of
ending dependency, believing that it could help patients or
clients achieve some final state of independence.51 Yet while
social workers envisioned home care as a public job—with
the features of dependable employment—the predominance
of the medical model, among other things, resulted in
increased casualization of the labor.
From the 1940s up to the early 1960s, social workers
and welfare advocates transformed (through patchwork
means and backdoor channels) a program originally
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 56.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 41.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 66.
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intended for children into a long-term care system.52 That it
took shape as a welfare service would have ramifications
well into the future—for policy makers, consumers, workers,
and the American labor movement. For in the years after
World War II, the major expansions of the United States
welfare state occurred through the Hill-Burton Act, which
funneled money into hospital development and medical
institutions, and the growth of Social Security pensions.53
Advocates for home care never had access to those more
generous components of the American welfare state.54 They
only had access to the lesser titles of the Social Security
Act—those set up for child welfare, adult categorical aid (old
age indigence, blindness, and disability) and social
services.55 Although home-based care would eventually
become crucial to the medical system, these programs
stayed within the realm of welfare policy.
Proponents of the service created a dual ideology of
rehabilitation. The “deserving” clients of social assistance—
the elderly, chronically ill, and disabled—depended on the
“undeserving” recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).56 From the 1930s on, each generation of
government officials clung to the premise that poor single
mothers could end their own dependency on welfare by
maintaining the independence of those incapacitated
through no fault of their own—that is, by performing care
work.57 They could become rehabilitated in the process of
rehabilitating others.58
What developed before the War on Poverty was a
combined public/private system of care with poor women on
public assistance as both the receivers and workers. The
War on Poverty in the 1960s provided new vehicles for the
state to expand the home care labor market. The new Office
of Economic Opportunity in 1964 created programs for
AFDC recipients to meet the labor shortage in service
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 12, 51-52.
56. Id. at 12.
57. Id. at 12-13.
58. Id. at 13.
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occupations, especially health and child aides, home
attendants, and homemaker aides, positions still classified
by the United States Department of Labor as similar to
domestic service.59 Anti-poverty warriors argued these could
be made over into “New Careers.”60 But essentially, the new
career turned out to be much like the old one: a low-waged
job in domestic labor. The legacy of the Johnson years lay
with new rights and services for the elderly through the
Older Americans Act and Medicare. Because home care,
while necessary to keep people in their communities was
deemed not medical, few Medicare dollars would go to it.
Instead, Medicaid became over time the de facto funding
mechanism for home care: needs-based and dependent on
state-level largess.61 It remained part of the contentious
politics of welfare.
Although home care workers began organizing through
the variety of social movements of the 1960s and 1970s—
especially welfare rights and domestic workers rights—they
found themselves once again pushed into the economic
shadows when the FLSA came up for amendment in 1974.
With every anti-poverty program that channeled particular
poor women into home care jobs, Congress continually
deferred the inclusion of care workers in the labor law.
During the 1960s, amendments to the FLSA placed
agricultural, nursing home, and many retail workers under
59. See Toward Full Employment: Proposals for a Comprehensive
Employment and Manpower Policy in the United States: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Emp’t and Manpower of the Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
88th Cong. v-vii, at 25 (1964); Services to the Elderly on Public Assistance:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal, State, and Community Servs. of the
Special Comm. on Aging, 89th Cong. 10 (1965) (statement of Dr. Ellen Winston).
60. ARTHUR PEARL & FRANK RIESSMAN, NEW CAREERS FOR THE POOR: THE
NONPROFESSIONAL IN HUMAN SERVICES 13 (1965); FRED POWLEDGE, NEW
CAREERS: REAL JOBS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE DISADVANTAGED 1-3 (Public Aff.
Comm., Public Aff. Pamphlet No. 427 1968).
61. See PENNY HOLLANDER FELDMAN ET AL., WHO CARES FOR THEM? WORKERS
HOME CARE INDUSTRY (1990); ADMIN. ON AGING, HUMAN RESOURCES IN
FIELD OF AGING: HOMEMAKER-HOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON
AGING OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN GERONTOLOGY, NO. 2 (1977); Katherine RickerSmith, A Historical and Critical Overview of the Development and Operation of
California’s In-Home Supportive Services Program, S.F. HOME HEALTH SERV.,
GRANT HEW-100-78-0027, 31-36 (1978), available at Calif. State Library;
Brahna Trager, Homemaker-Home Health Aide Services in the U.S., U.S.
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 10-12 (1973).
IN THE
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the federal wage and hour law.62 Still, most in Congress
could not accept home care as work, on par with other paid
employment; a mixture of housekeeping and bodily care, the
job consisted of tasks expected from unpaid wives,
daughters, and mothers. In 1974, Congress finally included
private household workers in the wage and hour law in one
of the largest legislative expansions of FLSA.63 Nursing
home workers were also included for overtime pay.64 But at
this moment of triumph—a critical civil rights gain for
women of color—those doing the same care work in
individual homes were left out.65
A definitional ruse reduced the home aide to an elder
companion.66 The Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare explicitly refused “to include within the terms
‘domestic service’ such activities as babysitting and acting
as a companion.”67 Companion or sitter implied friendly
visitors, not women who labored to support themselves or
their families.68 The passive term “watch” implied no real
work was going on.69 When the Department of Labor
promulgated rules for the implementation of the 1974 FLSA
amendments, it codified this previously nonexistent
“companionship exemption.”70 Congress remedied one

62. See Phyllis Palmer, Outside the Law: Agricultural and Domestic Workers
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 J. POL’Y HIST. 419, 419-40 (1995).
63. See Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Making Home Care: Law and Social
Policy in the U.S. Welfare State, in INTIMATE LABORS: CULTURES, TECHNOLOGIES,
AND THE POLITICS OF CARE 187-203 (Eileen Boris & Rachel Salazar Parrenas eds.,
2010) [hereinafter Boris & Klein, Making Home Care].
64. See id.
65. “Highlights of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974,” S1,
B11, “Minimum Law,” 417-18.
66. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 131.
67. See id.; U.S. Congress, S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, Fair Labor
Standards Act Amendments of 1971, at 30 (1971); SUBCOMM. ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, UNITED STATES SENATE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (PUBLIC LAW 93-259), at 964 (1976)
(statement of Sen. Javits) [hereinafter “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FLSA OF
1974”].
68. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 131.
69. Id.
70. Boris & Klein, Making Home Care, supra note 63, at 196-97.
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injustice but generated a new inequality by explicitly
omitting those newly termed as elder companions.
The final legislative language opened the way for
administrative rule-making that would keep homemakers
outside the law. Whether from outdated notions of the
companion or downright ignorance about the maintenance
of impaired individuals, Congress classified household
chores such as “making lunch or throwing a diaper into the
washing machine” as “incidental” rather than integral to
the labor.71 It was then up to the Department of Labor’s
Wage and Hour Division to draft the new regulations that
would implement the FLSA amendments.72 After an open
comment period, the Wage and Hour Division issued its
final ruling in February 1975 exempting elder companions
from the newly extended FLSA coverage.73 What
distinguished the companion from the domestic now was the
amount of time spent in housework not directly related to
care. If housework was incidental to the job, less than 20%
of the workday, then the worker was a companion rather
than a domestic and therefore outside the law.74 This
formulation ignored the actual work of home care, which
involved a range of household tasks that allowed the family
or individual to function in a domestic environment.75 The
final rule excluded not only aides hired directly by a
household but also those employed by hospitals and private
health and social welfare agencies (referred to as “third
parties”) previously covered under the law.76 The Wage and
Hour Division offered no explanation for changing the

71. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 132; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
supra note 67, at 964 (statement of Sen. Burdick).

OF THE

FLSA

OF 1974,

72. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 132.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; compare Employment of Domestic Service Employees, 39 Fed. Reg.
35,382, 35,383-84 (proposed Oct. 1, 1974) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552),
with Employment of Domestic Service Employees, 29 C.F.R. §§ 552.5, 552.103,
552.106 (1975).
76. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 132; see Opinion Letter of Wage-Hour
Administrator, No. 1226 (WH-174), [1969–1973 Transfer Binder] 2 CCH LAB. L.
REP. ¶ 30,809, at 42,262 (1972).
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status of home care workers.77 The rule freed staffing
agencies from paying minimum wages and overtime.
The reclassification of home care workers in the mid1970s occurred just as the demand for long-term care began
to explode, with senior citizens and a disability rights
movement calling for community and home-based
alternatives to institutionalization in the face of horrifying
nursing home scandals.78 After 1976, the home health care
sector entered a phase of significant growth—that is yet
unabated—as counties and states turned aides into more
casualized workers. Conveniently, it came just as home care
service was rapidly becoming a growth industry; changes to
Medicare, Medicaid, and other government programs,
especially after 1980, fueled a new for-profit sector.79 This
determination that home care would be low-paid, low-cost,
labor somehow reassured governments that herein lay the
answer to several welfare problems: overcrowding of public
hospitals, rising cost of nursing homes, an aging population,
and public refusal to spend tax dollars on “welfare.”
Two soon-to-be dominant forms of delivery emerged in
the 1970s: the independent contractor and the private
vendor.80 Local and state governments turned to contracting
home care through private agencies or designating care
workers as “independent contractors” without benefits or
job security. By distancing such workers from public
employment, states denied responsibility for the working
conditions of an occupation whose contours government
policies had done so much to set during the previous quarter
century.

77. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 133.
78. See id. at 115-16 nn.106-07 (citing Frank J. Prial, Abram Names 4 to
Panel on Nursing Home Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1975, at 69; Excerpts from
Cuomo’s Report to Carey About Nursing Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1975, at 30;
John L. Hess, Care of Aged Poor a Growing Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1974, at
1, 40; Memorandum from Alice M. Brophy, to Marvin Schick and Leon Panetta
(Mar. 18, 1971); Subject Files, in JOHN LINDSAY PAPERS 1966–1973).
79. Andrew Sasz, The Labor Impacts of Policy Change in Health Care: How
Federal Policy Transformed Home Health Organizations and Their Labor
Practices, 15 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 191, 195-96 (1990); The Black Box
Report, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 2 (1986).
80. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 133.
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II. ORGANIZING
Even as the welfare state location of the labor devalued
the workforce, it opened up a new site of social and political
struggle. How could these women gain a measure of
political and economic power, in spite of enormous
structural, ideological, and political obstacles? The story is a
complicated one, especially since they faced the challenge of
figuring out the structures of an ever shifting, evolving
welfare state. Structurally, unions seeking to organize
home care workers had to deal with the reality that the jobs
were dispersed—while there were tens of thousands of
workers, there was no common work site. Most workers
never saw each other, and many had little sense that there
were so many others out there doing the same kind of work.
Further, the work is different. The actual labor process
is relational, creating interdependence.81 Such work consists
of more than tasks completed. It doesn’t produce something
that can be quantitatively measured, or easily represented,
in the GNAT82 Essential to the job are emotional labor,
affection, and building trust.83 Workers cannot go on strike
and simply leave clients who are unable to get out of bed. 84
After spending many hours, weeks, even years with a client,
the job may end suddenly with the death of the person cared
for. Part of these workers’ struggle involves establishing
legitimacy of care itself in a way that defies our most takenfor-granted definitions of work as production.
Politically, unions faced an additional challenge: how to
build a labor movement of poor people in a service so
heavily dependent on state funding. The emergence of this
movement coincided with President Reagan’s cuts to social
service, welfare, urban policy, tax policies, and Medicaid.85
Women got squeezed as both clients and workers of the
welfare state.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
83. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING (1983); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S
LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999); CLARE L. STACEY,
THE CARING SELF: THE WORK EXPERIENCE OF HOME CARE AIDES (2011).
84. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 9.
85. Id. at 149-81.
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We have identified a series of organizing strategies that
responded to the structure of home care since the 1960s.
First, organizing took place among homemakers as
employees of social welfare departments, that is, as welfare
workers in New York swept up by the mid-1960s rise of
public employee unionism.86 Second, organizing occurred
among welfare recipients, led by the independent living
movement, which lobbied for the payments that made home
care as a consumer service possible. But by winning a
method of service delivery based on the employment of the
care worker as an “independent contractor” (or provider), it
established a framework that made it difficult for workers
to find any clear employer to bargain collectively with.87 A
third organizing strategy was unionization as part of the
service sector—through unions such as the SEIU.88 This
involved coalition building, community organizing, and
political unionism. A fourth organizing strategy coincided
with the union effort: legal challenges to exclusion of
workers from definitions of “employee” or labor standards. 89
The legal challenge produced a two-track result:
restructuring the state through public policy (for example,
by creating new public authorities in California or state
Home Care Commissions elsewhere to stand in for the
multitude of dispersed employers);90 and a series of court
cases that eventually culminated in an unsuccessful 2007
Supreme Court case, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v.
Coke.91 A fifth and final organizing strategy has emerged not
from unions but from a revitalized domestic worker
movement led by immigrant women from the Americas and
Asia to revalue care under the banner of “Caring Across the
Generations.”92 This movement aims to improve jobs
86. See id. at 78-82, 89-91.
87. See id. at 94-108.
88. See id. at 123-82.
89. Boris & Klein, Making Home Care, supra note 63, at 187-203.
90. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 194-99, 213-14; Boris & Klein, Making
Home Care, supra note 63, at 187-203.
91. 551 U.S. 158 (2007).
92. See Barbara Ehrenreich, The Nannies’ Norma Rae, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr.
26, 2011); Ai-Jen Poo, A Twenty-First Century Organizing Model: Lessons from
the New York Domestic Workers Bill of Rights Campaign, 21 NEW LAB. FORUM
50, 50-55 (2011).
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through training, higher wages, a new path to citizenship,
and connecting those who need care with those who do
care.93
The story of home care organizing in Chicago and
Illinois in the final decades of the twentieth century
powerfully illustrates the tangle of public and private forces
against which home care organizing occurred and how
workers came out of the shadows to fight back.
In the mid-1970s, Illinois took advantage of federal
monies to develop community care for the elderly.94 Illinois
initially ran its home care program out of public welfare.95
In 1979 Illinois established two programs to pay for home
care through its general revenues.96 The Illinois Department
of Aging started the Community Care Program, which
contracted with a wide-range of nonprofit and proprietary
agencies to offer homemaker and housekeeping services to
those over age sixty.97 Workers became employees of
vendors rather than the state.98 In a separate program
disabled people under sixty would receive similar assistance
from the Department of Rehabilitative Services (DORS),
funded in good part after 1984 by Medicaid.99 In keeping
with the ethos of independence, DORS relied on a different
mode: clients hired their own provider, who could be family
or friends, with the state claiming to be a co-employer—and
it set wages, for most of the decade at minimum wage.100
Workers had no hospital or medical insurance, paid
vacation, compensated sick days, life insurance, or
compensation for time spent traveling to and from clients’
homes, often on long bus and subway rides.101

93. Laura Flanders, Can ‘Caring Across the Generations’ Change the World?,
THE NATION (Apr. 11, 2012); see also CARING ACROSS GENERATIONS,
www.caringacrossgenerations.org (last visited Mar. 13, 2013).
94. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 162.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 163.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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ACORN came to town to change all of this in 1983,
planting a branch of its United Labor Unions (ULU).102 Key
ACORN leaders and rank and filers had come out of the
welfare rights movement.103 Like other radicals of the
period, they had developed a sectoral analysis that linked
low wage workers with those on public assistance, including
poor single mothers.104 The ACORN model tied together
workplace issues, such as wages and working conditions,
with community ones, such as struggles over housing,
banking, and living wage campaigns. Union organizing was
one part of a broader mobilization against poverty. ULU,
which in Chicago would become SEIU Local 880, used direct
action and political lobbying with agency-by-agency
bargaining.105 It built power by recruiting members through
door to door canvassing, house meetings, and developing
leaders for specific actions. From the get go, it mobilized
members for electoral campaigns to gain access to political
power. It would “build an organization first” that could
maintain itself during workplace campaigns that could take
years.106 Members paid dues from the moment they signed
up, well before the union had a contract or certification; for
people who made little, paying over that few dollars a
month cemented organizational loyalty.107
With a cadre of just fifteen to twenty paid members, out
of a total workforce of 225, the union dramatically made its
presence known in October 1983 at National Home Care
Systems (NHS), a domestic temp agency formerly named
McMaid.108 An organizing committee, led by employees Irma
Sherman, Doris Gould, and Juanita Hill, showed up at the
McMaid/NHS office on pay day, and gathered workers
willing to listen to their testimonials of mistreatment and
disrespect. Sherman, Gould, Hill, and others marched into
the offices chanting, “We’re Fired UP,” singing, and
102. Id.; Keith Kelleher, ACORN Organizing and Chicago Homecare Workers,
80 LAB. RES. REV. 33, 33 (1986).
103. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 163.
104. Id.; see Kelleher, supra note 102, at 36.
105. See TAIT, supra note 9, at 101-28; Kelleher, supra note 102, at 33, 36-37.
106. Kelleher, supra note 102, at 37.
107. Discount Foundation Application Summary, c. 880 Records, Box 2, Folder
31 (1986); see Kelleher, supra note 102, at 40.
108. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 167.
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demanding a meeting with the boss.109 When the executive
director came out, Sherman announced their union was
ULU 880, and asked him to sign a “Recognition
Agreement.”110 He declined, called the police, and retreated
to his office amid louder chants.111 Their union had become
public; the workers had made their point.112 This event was
the first of many “recognition actions.”113
By the 1980s, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) had become essentially dysfunctional, as
management perfected ways to contest every aspect of the
organizing process, undermine union elections, and stall
bargaining.114 Local 880’s collective self-assertion of the
union served as an adaptive strategy to deal with the
limitations of the NLRB regime. As lead organizer Keith
Kelleher explained, “we didn’t wait for the employer to
formally recognize us, but forced the employer to deal with
us without official recognition.”115 The members made it a
union, not the state.116 Since they were treated as not real
workers within the framework of the nation’s laws, these
women honed a different set of tactics for unionism in the
care work sector that linked public and private: recognition
actions, member bargaining, direction action, political
lobbying and pressure, and strategic use of “consumer
choice.”117
At NHS, the union won its election fairly quickly, but
contract bargaining turned into trench warfare that led it to
combine the militant direct action of welfare rights—
showing up en masse at the owner’s plush suburban estate
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see Union Wins YMCA Election, Company Stalls, LOCAL 880 VOICE
(1985).
114. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 167; DAVID BRODY, LABOR EMBATTLED:
HISTORY, POWER, AND RIGHTS 99-109 (2005).
115. Id.; Keller, “A History of SEIU Local 880” (2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author); Union Wins YMCA Election, Company Stalls
LOCAL 880 VOICE, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 1.
116. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 167.
117. Id. at 166.
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and pinning a notice on his door—with political unionism,
as Local 880 creatively deployed tactics that blurred the
public and private domains.118 Workers turned their
relationship with consumers and the state to their
advantage.119 They raised the specter that they would ask
their clients to transfer to another agency.120 In the care
work sector, moving consumers to another agency had a
similar impact to a strike, without leaving those cared for
stranded.121 The union then gambled on calling an actual
strike, which required notice to the State Department of
Aging as well as the company. NHS now faced the prospect
that the state would drop it as a problematic contractor and
decided to settle. Local 880 won a “union shop,” paid
holidays and vacations, a grievance procedure, health and
safety protective clause, and a “Dignity and Respect”
clause.122 Subsequently, when facing other recalcitrant
agencies, the union helped to move former employees to
union shops.123
118. Id.
119. See Letter from Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880, to John
Sweeney (Dec. 5, 1986), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 36, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Mark Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home
Care Sys., to All Field Staff (Oct. 27, 1986), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11,
Folder 41, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Year End/Year Begin
Report (July 1, 1993), at 4, in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 8, Folder 41, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Year End/Year Begin Report (Dec. 30, 1989), at 2,
in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 8, Folder 41, available at Wisconsin Historical
Society; Year End/Year Begin Report-1986 (Jan. 2, 1987), at 3, in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 8, Folder 41, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Meeting
Agenda (Apr. 25, 1987), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 5, Folder 2, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Meeting Agenda (Mar. 28, 1987),21n LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 5, Folder 2, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
121. See id.; N.H.S. Contract Victory, Strike is Off, THE HOMEMAKER’S VOICE:
SPECIAL CONTRACT ISSUE (n.d.); Interview with Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer,
Local 880.
122. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 167; N.H.S. Contract Victory, supra note
119; Letter from Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880, to Olson and Mark
Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys. (June 17, 1985); Letter from Mark
Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys., to Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer,
Local 880 (June 10, 1985).
123. Homecare: Where the Heart Is, HEALTHCARE WORKER UPDATE,
Winter/Spring 1991, at 9; Letter from Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local
880, to John Sweeney, supra note 119; Letter from John J. Eganto to Dr. Jean
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The union consistently cultivated rank and file leaders
from among home attendant members, like local presidents
Irma Sherman and Helen Miller.124 The women created a
social world around the union, with regular meetings,
parties, barbeques, recognition ceremonies, letter writing
campaigns, marches, and neighborhood alliances.125 They
held “speakouts” and “honk-ins,” stopping traffic.126 These
most invisible workers made themselves visible and
audible.127
Winning a contract was certainly a big victory, but it
was only the first step Any ability to raise pay depended on
the public budget. ULU mobilized its own members, taking
busloads of workers to the capitol at Springfield, Illinois to
meet with legislators, the Illinois Department of Aging, and
the Republican governor. For these battles, though, the
ULU local needed greater political clout and a larger
support network. After a member vote, Chicago’s unit voted
in 1985 to merge into the SEIU, a fast growing union
representing over one million service workers in public and
private workplaces.128
But Local 880 cut its own political path. It drew on
direct action tactics more familiar to welfare rights than to
the late twentieth century labor movement. Toward the end
of 1985, seventy members picketed the Governor’s office and
won a new state Home Care Task Force, which would
enable all players to develop policy guidelines and
Otwell, (Jan. 2, 1985); Year End/Year Begin Report (July 1, 1993), supra note
119, at 4; Year End/Year Begin Report (Dec. 30, 1989), supra note 119, at 2;
Year End/Year Begin Report-1986 (Jan. 2, 1987), supra note 119, at 3.
124. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 165.
125. See Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, We Were the Invisible
Organizing Home Care, in THE SEX OF CLASS 177, 189 (Dorothy Sue
2007); Keith Kelleher, Local 880 Industry Profile/Organizing
Homecare Sector (Feb. 12, 1993), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 8,
available at Wisconsin Historical Society.

Workforce:
Cobble ed.,
Model for
Folder 49,

126. Id. at 166.
127. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 165-66.
128. See id. at 169 n.95 (citing Letter from Gene Moats, in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 1, Folder 33, available at Wisconsin Historical Society);
Confidential Memorandum from Wade Rathke to Keith Kelleher, Lead
Organizer, Local 880 (Mar. 2, 1993), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 41,
available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
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coordinate demands for increased reimbursement rates. 129
Such political remedies institutionalized the potential of
provider agencies and the union to work together in the
arena of the welfare state. From then on, 880 workers
organized busloads of union members to go to Springfield
and meet with legislators, Department of Aging staff, and
governors.
One other key factor helped the union win its first
contract. A new NHS executive director, Mark Heaney,
came on board in May 1985, and he too understood the
political economy of home care.130 Where the previous
executive took an ideological hard line against the union,
Heaney approached the situation as a pragmatist.131 He
grasped both the potential threat from the union’s appeal to
the state and the strategic advantages of “partnership”132
Heaney realized the union’s political organizing and
disruption could cost NHS its state contract.133 After the
June 1985 settlement, Heaney kept communication with the
union open, worked with the union to implement a health
insurance plan, and sought out the points where NHS could
use the union to increase its client base.134 Heaney was not
an unequivocal friend of the union, but he recognized they
had a common interest in protecting the state’s social
welfare budget, fighting tax cuts, and disciplining the
market.135
Where those interests overlapped, the partnership
worked. Heaney served on the Governor’s Task Force too,
where he joined the union in pushing to increase the state
reimbursement rate.136 Described by the union as the first
substantial raise in four years, this 1986 boost helped
129. Union Members Going to Springfield, supra note 1; Year End/Year Begin
Report-1986, supra note 119.
130. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 169.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Letters between Mark Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys., and
Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880 (1985–1993) in LOCAL 880 RECORDS,
Box 11, Folders 41-46, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
135. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 169.
136. Id.
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secure an even better second contract from NHS and
affected thousands of other home care workers around
Illinois.137 Amid Reagan’s open warfare on the welfare state,
for-profit, corporate NHS distributed postcards to all staff
employees to write to the legislature and the governor to
support proposed tax increases.138 By the early 1990s, NHS
top management even appropriated the language of justice
and comparable worth.139 Pointing out that Illinois paid
more to “a janitor to clean floors and toilets” than to
homemakers and aides, NHS owner Andrew Wright
asserted “that a gross injustice exists in the reimbursement
rates paid for home care services and that a rate adjustment
is due.”140 To coordinate collective bargaining with the state
budget process, NHS shared information with the union on
hours billed to the state for chore housekeepers and
homemakers, and both union and company cooperated to
force shady agencies out of the market.141 In that sense, the
union helped to stabilize its industry by setting best
practices, rewarding firms that met its labor standards, and
policing non-union employers much as unions like the
United Mine Workers and Amalgamated Clothing Workers
did earlier in the century.142
Cooperation,
though,
remained
circumscribed,
especially concerning balance of power. NHS and Local 880
did not exactly lobby together.143 The union sent its people to
Springfield, while the company or Association of Home Care
Providers worked their own channels of influence.144 When it
137. Id at 170; Year End/Year Begin Report-1986 (Jan. 2, 1987), supra note
119.
138. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170; Letter from Mark Heaney, Exec.
Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys., to Serv. Emp'rs. Int’l Union Local 880 Bargaining
Comm. (June 3, 1991), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11, Folder 42, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Mark Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home
Care Sys., to Nat’l Home Care Sys. Staff—Office & Field (June 5, 1987), in
LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 44, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
139. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170.
140. Id.; Letter from Andrew Wright, Owner, Nat’l Home Care Sys., to Mark
Heaney, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Home Care Sys. (Dec. 1, 1993), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS,
Box 11, Folder 46, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
141. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 170.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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came down to the dividing up the rate increase between
wages and profits, they became adversaries again.145
Meanwhile, the union continually filed grievances against
the company on minimum wage violations.146
Perpetually, though, Local 880 and ACORN ran up
against the public-private conundrum that shaped home
care employment.147 Vendors claimed that the state was the
employer or coemployer, and the state argued that the
vendors were the responsible party. On one hand, the state
placed them under the Domestic Workers Law (which after
1974 meant they should earn at least minimum wage). On
the other, when the union tried to gain redress for wage and
hour violations, the state waved the 1975 FLSA
companionship exemption in their faces. The legal structure

145. Id.; Interview with Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880.
146. See Union Members Win Backpay!, LOCAL 880 VOICE, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 1;
Affidavit of Thelma Brown (Apr. 2, 1986), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Daniel New to Keith Kelleher (May 3,
1988), in SEIU RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 45, available at Wayne State Univ.;
Letter from Terrance Barnich to Janet Otwell (June 12, 1986), in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 42, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter
from Terrance Barnich to Janet Otwell (June 6, 1986), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS,
Box 4, Folder 42, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Keith
Kelleher to Nelson Keilt and Herbert Cohen (Apr. 25, 1986), in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 42, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter
from William Ghesquiere to Herbert Cohen (Apr. 4, 1986), in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, Box 4, Folder 42, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter
from Keith Kelleher to Gene Moats (Feb. 4, 1986), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 4,
Folder 36, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Daniel New to
Keith Kelleher (Nov. 27, 1985), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at Wisconsin
Historical Society; Letter from Keith Kelleher to Daniel New (Oct. 19, 1984), in
LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from
Daniel New to Keith Kelleher (Oct. 2, 1984), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Keith Kelleher to Daniel New (Sept.
25, 1984), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at Wisconsin Historical Society;
Letter from Daniel New to Keith Kelleher (Sept. 19, 1984), in LOCAL 880
RECORDS, available at Wisconsin Historical Society; Letter from Keith Kelleher
to Daniel New (July 9, 1984), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at Wisconsin
Historical Society; Letter from Keith Kelleher to Daniel New (June 15, 1984), in
LOCAL 880 RECORDS, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
147. State of Illinois, Before the State Labor Relations Board, DORS v. SEIU,
Case No. S-RC-115, in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11, Folder 3, available at
Wisconsin Historical Society; Petitioner’s Post-Hearing Brief, S-RC-115, 13, in
LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11, Folder 3, available at Wisconsin Historical Society.
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made it impossible for them to organize collectively or win
any economic gains through private agencies.
The way the state structured care in response to other
stakeholders also mattered. Thousands of Chicago-area
home care workers did not work for vendor agencies.
Through DORS, which serviced the disabled, workers were
classified as “independent providers.”148 Without them in the
union, the state had an enormous reserve pool of labor. Yet,
the union encountered the same obfuscation of identifying
the employer. Was it the state, which allotted the service
hours, paid the salaries, and withheld workers comp? Or
was it the client who had “the sole responsibility to hire,
dismiss, train, supervise and discipline workers”?149
The union proceeded with its organizing project
anyway. The state comptroller’s office maintained records of
checks issued to the attendants, available for public
viewing. Local 880 organizers combed through these and
painstakingly built a list.150 They reached middle-aged
women like future President Miller, a transplanted rural
Mississippian who had labored in laundries and factories. 151
Her husband was a union man, and she was one of those
women whose efforts sustained the black church.152 Soon she
was going along on house visits and, like other DORS
workers, participating in the life of the local through
membership meetings, fundraising events, canvassing, and
lobbying days.153 DORS workers joined the fabric of the
union, participating in membership meetings, fundraising
events, canvassing, legal actions, and lobbying days.154
These members led a legislative campaign for a Home care
Workers’ Bill of Rights, collecting pledges from legislators.155

148. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 149-81.
149. State of Illinois, supra note 147; Petitioner’s Post-Hearing Brief, supra
note 147.
150. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 173.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Kelleher, supra note 102, at 39-43, 49-51.
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An involved workforce remained essential to Local 880’s
vision of unionism.156
The state refused to formally recognize the union but
through persistent mobilization, political allies, and
militant pressure, the union compelled the state to accede to
wage raises and other demands. Between 1985 and 1990,
through member lobbying and political clout, the union
managed to win wage hikes to $4.50 an hour and eliminate
underpayments.157 Through incremental steps like a “Meet
and Confer” agreement in 1990, workers won an
institutional foothold within the political process that
determined their security and that of their clients, while the
union kept its sights on the horizon and built for some day
in the future when a majority of workers would become
members.158
Based on their caring relationships, workers also acted
politically with consumers, as disability rights activists
refer to themselves. Their fates were linked by the question
of enough hours for the service. In the economic downturn
of the early 1990s, Illinois cut services to elderly and DORS
by refusing new applicants. ADAPT, a militant independent
living group, launched confrontational protests in
Chicago.159 Disability rights activists brought suit, with the
result that a federal court prohibited the state from denying
eligible Medicaid recipients in-home services.160 Local 880
workers became allies with independent living activists and
advocates to “stop the cuts.”161 Women and men in
wheelchairs rolled through Springfield, Illinois to the
capitol, along with workers who carried oversized pennies. 162
156. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 173.
157. Boris & Klein, Organizing the Carework Economy, supra note 18, at 205
n.67 (citing Memorandum from Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880, to
Harry Kurshenbaum (Feb. 1, 1993), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 11, Folder 15,
available at Wisconsin Historical Society).
158. See Memorandum from Keith Kelleher, Lead Organizer, Local 880, to
Gene Moats (Mar. 24, 1992), in LOCAL 880 RECORDS, Box 1, Folder 32, available
at Wisconsin Historical Society.
159. BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 6, at 175.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 173-74 (focusing specifically on the SEIU photos from the SEIU
Collection).
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Home care workers would defend these entitlements by
creating an arena of struggle in which workers refused to
play their role—providing care on the cheap
For another decade, the workers paid their dues,
attended meetings, and built the union—still without
recognition. Finally, through financial and ground support
for the Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Rod
Blagojevich, in 2004, a labor-supportive governor came into
office and through executive order formally recognized
SEIU Local 880 as the collective bargaining agent for these
workers.163 Within months, the state legislature codified his
executive order into law, representing one of largest formal
extensions of labor rights in decades.164 They had, in fact,
changed the landscape of political power.
CONCLUSION
Longer life expectancy means that more of us live with
chronic illness. A majority of Americans, across the
spectrum of class and ethnicity, will at some point depend
on a caretaker, often one who has long labored in poverty
and struggled to balance her own and others’ social needs.
The macroeconomic structuring of the occupation, as well as
its interpersonal challenges, heightens the stresses of an
already emotionally and psychologically intense and
economically precarious job. Workers, family members,
state administrators, and policy makers all wring their
hands in frustration over the undependability of home care
services; for the former there are not enough trustworthy or
reliable workers.
In December of 2011, President Obama made good on a
campaign promise and finally announced that the United
States Department of Labor would move to overturn the
companionship exemption and include these workers in the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA.165
Obama’s proposal not only rectifies a thirty-year injustice,
but also faces the realities of both our aging society and
163. See Kelleher, supra note 102, at 39-43, 49-51.
164. See Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Labor on the Home Front: Unionizing
Home-Based Care Workers, 17 NEW LAB. FORUM 32, 39 (2008).
165. 158 CONG. REC. H4067 (daily ed. June 27, 2012) (statement of Rep. Tim
Walberg).
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service labor in the twenty-first century American economy.
The new Department of Labor proposal explicitly recognizes
that housekeeping is integrally bound up with caregiving in
the home, valuing the multi-dimensions of care as work. It
mandates agency payment for travel time of aides who move
between clients over the course of a day, acknowledging
that the very nature of the job means they do not labor in
one place for a standard number of hours.166 It closes
loopholes that the old category “employee” has allowed so
many to slip through.
While the job title has changed repeatedly since the
1930s, these workers always have performed a combination
of basic bodily care (bathing, dressing, feeding, and
ambulation) and housekeeping. In the current fiscal crisis,
states have used the slipperiness of the companionship
terminology to squeeze the workers and extract more
unpaid labor. State agencies are recalculating what family
members would supposedly provide anyway, reducing the
amount of home care support based on expanding the range
of unpaid labor. States are reducing the hours a worker can
spend with a client and targeting housekeeping for
elimination.
This decades-long fight, therefore, is not simply about
the ability to earn the minimum wage or just above it for
working even longer hours; that would not be much to bring
home, nor greatly bolster one’s ability to sustain a home. If
the rule change were solely the ability to earn $7.25 an hour
and over-time, home-care workers would still be poor. Its
deeper possibility is the potential to reestablish some notion
of labor standards, rights, and security—the very elements
that conservatives and employers have been so successful at
subverting over the last two decades, especially in the
service sectors. Clearly, the exemption of workers from
labor standards is not making better care more widely
accessible. Instead, the stigmatization of care—and those
who need it—is creating greater insecurity and hardship It
166. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Amend the Companionship and
Live-In
Worker
Regulations,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsa/companionNPRM.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2013)
(discussing Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 76
Fed. Reg. 81190, 81201-02 (proposed Dec. 27, 2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
pt. 552)).
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compromises the independence and dignity of those on both
sides of the relation. Separating better care from better jobs
and working conditions has moved us no further toward a
viable and decent long-term care program. It turns out the
devaluation of one has only perpetuated the devaluation of
the other.

